Expanded Horizons: Reconsidering American Responses to Adolf Hitler by Wallin, Andrew
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
2013
Expanded Horizons: Reconsidering American
Responses to Adolf Hitler
Andrew Wallin
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
Part of the History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wallin, Andrew, "Expanded Horizons: Reconsidering American Responses to Adolf Hitler" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. Paper
1660.
  
 
 
 
“Expanded Horizons”: Reconsidering American Responses to Adolf Hitler 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Andrew Wallin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee 
 
of Lehigh University 
 
in Candidacy for the Degree of 
 
 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
in 
 
The Department of History 
 
 
 
 
Lehigh University 
 
May, 2013 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Copyright 
Andrew Wallin 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master 
of Arts in the Department of History. 
 
 
 
“Expanded Horizons”: Reconsidering American Responses to Adolf Hitler 
Andrew Wallin 
 
 
 
                                                 
Date Approved 
 
                                                                     
        Roger Simon, Thesis Director 
                                                                          
     
                                                                    
         
 
 
                                                                      
        Nitzan Lebovic, Co-Director 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
        Stephen Cutcliffe, Department Chair 
 
 
        
iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract        1 
 
Introduction       2 
 
Part II 9 
 
Part III 17 
 
Part IV 27 
 
Part V 64 
 
 
 
Vita        74 
1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This essay seeks to take the broad historiographical issue of teleology and apply it 
to a specific historical event, namely, the rise of Hitler and the establishment of the Third 
Reich. The common narrative of this period typically follows a set structure: the Nazis 
come to power in Germany, begin agitating on the European continent, slowly expand 
their territory, oppress the Jews of Europe, and finally begin a military contest that 
precipitates the Second World War. This chronology reinforces the notion that not only 
was the Second World War an inevitable result of the Nazi policies that preceded it, but 
also that contemporary observers should have come to the same conclusions. In this 
study, the argument is advanced that while both the American government and general 
public were indeed aware of what we would now deem as warning signs of the trouble to 
come, at the time there was no reason to believe that Hitler’s ascension to the German 
Chancellorship presented any imminent threat to the world, much less the United States. 
By exploring contemporary media reports, this essay contextualizes the events of early 
1933 and attempts to arrive at contemporaneous, rather than present-day, understandings 
of the perceived implications of a Nazified Germany. 
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“Expanded Horizons”: Reconsidering American Responses to Adolf Hitler1 
 
Part I. Introduction 
 
Surveying the wide and multi-faceted landscape of the twentieth century, one 
period in particular seems to rise above the rest; a looming mountain, casting shadows 
and coloring the appearance of the people and events both before and since. Though its 
peak is located over central Europe, its arms stretch south through Mediterranean Africa, 
north toward the Arctic circle, with some spurs thrusting out as far as the tiny islands in 
the middle of the Pacific Ocean. From 1939 to 1945, the Second World War raged across 
parts of four continents, leaving a legacy that stretches across both space and time. Not 
only did it precipitate the destruction and displacement of untold millions, but it has also 
occupied a place of prominence in collective consciousness ever since. In what is perhaps 
a natural consequence of this legacy, it has not been uncommon for historians to look at 
events and individuals that have followed, as well as preceded, this period through the 
smoky and blood-spattered lens of the war. In particular, the 1930s are more often than 
not viewed as a series of preludes—mere steps along the path that led systematically and 
with little divergence to all out warfare. 
But such a teleological approach – one that assumes a certain unavoidable end 
result – flirts with the common but problematic issue of historical anachronism. In other 
words, such methods project knowledge acquired after the fact to a time in the past when 
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 For the title of this work, I have borrowed a concept from John Lewis Gaddis. See The Landscape of 
History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4. 
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that information was unavailable. For example, just because it is now generally agreed 
that appeasement at Munich in 1938 encouraged the German invasion of Poland in 1939 
does not mean that Neville Chamberlain should have been excoriated as a “guilty man,” 
since he could hardly have known that his actions would lead to war.2 As far as he knew, 
his policies were a blueprint for peace, not an invitation to conflict. In fact, his belief that 
his diplomacy had secured “peace for our time” offers a perfect illustration that although 
history is learned backward it is lived forward. 
The implications of this uniquely historical issue have been the subject of much 
methodological discourse. According to Karl Löwith (1897-1973), a German-Jewish 
philosopher, this problem is a constant and perhaps even unavoidable consequence of the 
historical process: “The historical consciousness cannot but start with itself, though its 
aim is to know the thought of other times and of other men. . . . We understand—and 
misunderstand” the past, “but always in the light of contemporary thought, reading the 
book of history backward from the last to the first page. This inversion of the customary 
way of historical presentation is actually practiced even by those who proceed from past 
ages to modern times, without being conscious of their contemporary motivations.”3 
More recently, Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis has also acknowledged the 
difficulties encountered by anyone trying to recapture a pure sense of the past. Unlike 
with other academic disciplines, where lab experiments or computer simulations can 
recreate specific conditions or circumstances, “we cannot relive, retrieve, or rerun” 
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 Chamberlain, along with fourteen other British public figures, was the subject of a pseudonymously 
published tract in 1940 that placed the blame for the present conflict on those men and the so-called policy 
of appeasement. See Cato [pseud.], Guilty Men (London: V. Gollancz, 1940). 
3
 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1949), 2-3. 
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history. The past “is something we can never have.”4 But lest this admission discourage 
anyone from attempting to explore the past, Gaddis has suggested that perhaps the very 
thing that prevents us from reliving, retrieving, or rerunning the past actually helps us to 
better understand it. Those who live through history necessarily have a narrow 
perspective—one that precludes them from seeing larger patterns as events are occurring, 
or how one specific action might influence another. An historian, on the other hand, 
enjoys the benefits of an “expanded horizon,” wherein he or she can connect the complex 
and seemingly random dots of everyday life into a clear and cogent picture.5 Yet therein 
lies the problem. It is easy for the modern observer to look backward through time and 
see in the sequence of events in the 1930s a clear line leading from the Nazi political 
victories in 1933 to the red tide at Normandy or the unspeakable horrors of Auschwitz or 
Treblinka. But to impose that chronology upon the average American of 1933 is to 
promote a false temporality and ultimately an incorrect version of events. History 
assumes the ahistorical air of inevitability, and understandings of the present mar our 
perceptions of the past—symptoms of what Harvard’s Niall Ferguson has termed “the 
dubious benefit of hindsight.”6 But the challenge of history is to understand the past on its 
own terms—admittedly no small feat.  
The historiography of the pre-war years of the 1930s brings this particular issue 
into sharp focus. Take the following description from one account of the foreign policy of 
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. Diplomatic historian Robert A. Divine 
                                                          
4
 Gaddis, 3. 
5
 Ibid., 4. 
6
 Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 80. 
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has portrayed FDR’s neutrality policies of the mid 1930s as naïve—a characterization 
that itself implies that at the very least, the Roosevelt administration should have been 
braced for an inevitable German war. He then goes on to provide a more explicitly 
anachronistic assessment: FDR specifically and Americans in general failed “to 
comprehend that they were confronted by a revolution which threatened the very 
existence of the nation.”7 Aside from the somewhat hyperbolic tone, such an assessment 
is also problematic in that it faults the American government as well as the general 
population for what can only be considered a failure to predict the future. But what seems 
obvious in hindsight is rarely as clear in the present. It seems unfair, to say the least, to 
judge the actions and opinions of Americans in the 1930s based on what happened later 
in the 1940s. But as Löwith and others have posited, such is often the nature of historical 
analysis. 
Characterizations of this type are not limited to only one historian. In fact, the 
general account of world affairs in the 1930s and 1940s only reinforces this sense of 
inevitability. One would be hard pressed to find a secondary account of those decades 
that veers too far from the following basic narrative: the Nazis come to power in 
Germany, begin agitating on the European continent, slowly expand their territory, 
oppress the Jews of Europe, and finally begin a military contest that precipitates the 
Second World War. The following passage from the University of Maryland’s Wayne S. 
Cole might therefore seem unremarkable:  
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 Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1966), 48. 
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Officially, Hitler had come to power through legal and constitutional 
means in January, 1933. But he quickly converted the Weimar Republic 
into a Nazi dictatorship and quashed all opposition. He suppressed Jews, 
promised to eliminate indignities that the Versailles treaty had imposed on 
Germany, and determined to reestablish Germany’s place in Europe and 
the world. . . . Those alarming developments, however, were only preludes 
for even more terrifying crises in 1938 and after.8 
 
The author furthermore states that although other global developments, like Japanese 
aggression in Manchuria and the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, were both shocking and 
alarming, “it was Nazi Germany under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler that most 
frightened and shocked the moral sensibilities of Europeans and Americans alike.”9 At 
first glance, these statements seem pretty straightforward with little in terms of 
controversy. But perhaps that is because they fit the version of the story with which we 
are now so familiar. Like Divine’s account referenced in the preceding paragraph, this 
passage is indicative of a point of view that is indeed expansive, as Gaddis has advocated. 
But it is worth asking: does it accurately represent a contemporary understanding? Or is it 
more so the product of a modern viewpoint? When Hitler came to power, were 
Americans really alarmed and frightened, and to what degree? Were they concerned from 
the very beginning, or did they only become so over time? Given the considerable 
amount of anti-Semitism in America, was the treatment of the Jews an issue of real, 
widespread disquiet? Did Americans view a Nazified Germany as an imminent threat, or 
were there other, more pressing matters both at home and abroad that took priority? 
These questions and others will provide the framework for this essay.  
                                                          
8
 Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt & the Isolationists: 1932-45 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 
274. 
9
 Ibid., 274. 
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In characterizing developments in the 1930s as “preludes,” Cole, like Divine, 
subtly but surely introduces a teleological element into his version of events—as have 
many other accounts of that period. On one level such an approach is understandable. 
After all, it seems easy enough now to see how in Germany the end of democracy, the 
implementation of dictatorship, the oppression of Jews, and the overturning of Versailles 
laid the groundwork for Hitler’s vision of a Thousand Year Reich, which in turn led to a 
worldwide conflagration. But while it is important to make connections about the past, it 
is equally important to attempt to understand the past on its own terms. To borrow an 
idea from eminent historian Sir Geoffrey Elton, “The purpose of history is to understand 
the past, and if the past is to be understood it must be given full respect in its own 
right.”10 Thus, we cannot assume that the expanded horizons of the present were a part of 
the landscape of the past. Instead, we must acknowledge the presence of more limited 
vistas throughout history. When Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, no one, on 
either side of the Atlantic, could have known that he and his policies would precipitate 
another world war six years later. As the following analysis will endeavor to make clear, 
Hitler and the Nazis were essentially an unknown variable to Americans in the early 
1930s. In fact, many observers even doubted whether the new chancellor and his party 
would still be in power through the rest of 1933. Though it is difficult to “unlearn” what 
we know about the horrific consequences of the Nazi period, we must attempt to do so 
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 Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), qtd. on 197. 
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nevertheless, for that is the only way to truly begin to understand this specific point in 
history “in its own right.” 11 
This study will therefore seek to take a broad historiographical issue and apply it 
to a specific historical event, namely, the rise of Hitler and establishment of the Third 
Reich. After reviewing some of the more recent, secondary accounts of the early stages of 
Nazi rule, this essay will examine select sources from the American mass media of early 
1933 – newspapers, radio broadcasts, newsreels, and national periodicals – in order to get 
a better sense of the American reaction to developments in Germany. In doing so, it will 
become clear that contrary to most accounts of the pre-war years, while both the 
American government and general public were indeed aware of what we would now 
deem as warning signs of the trouble to come, at the time there was no reason to believe 
that Hitler’s ascension to the German Chancellorship presented any imminent threat to 
the world, much less the United States. That is not to suggest that no one voiced 
concerns. On the contrary, one can find numerous examples of Americans, Europeans, 
and no small amount of Germans who viewed Nazi governance with more than a 
modicum of unease. But to leave it at that is to ignore an important part of the story—
specifically, that there was another, far larger group of Americans who were 
unconcerned, indifferent, and even receptive to the idea of Nazi rule in Germany. 
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 Ferguson has made a similar point regarding the historiography of the First World War. To him, the 
primary task of the researcher is to determine “how far the many narratives of escalating crisis have been 
constructed by historians not to capture the past as it actually was in 1914, but to create an explanation of 
the war’s origins commensurate with the vast dimensions of what happened in the succeeding four years.” 
With a few chronological alterations, that very sentiment can (and should) be applied to the period leading 
up to the Second World War. See Ferguson, 80. 
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Furthermore, as the following discussion will suggest, the discrepancies between 
our own, present-day take on the pre-war period and that of those for whom 1933 was, in 
reality, part of a post-war era are reflective of what this essay will refer to as gaps in 
historical consciousness. These gaps, as present in the policy-making of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt as in American reactions to German anti-Semitism, become evident only when 
we recognize the intrinsically limited nature of real-time assessments (versus the 
expanded scope of historical understandings). Using this framework will help us to 
understand not simply what Americans thought in the first few months of 1933 but why 
they thought what they did. This larger picture, however, emerges not by taking a step 
back, to survey the expanded horizon of history, but rather by taking a more narrow 
perspective, focusing on the more (necessarily) limited viewpoints of Americans in early 
1933. It is January, the New Year has just arrived, and in the midst of nationwide 
excitement over the upcoming inauguration of an inspiring new president, news begins to 
filter through of a transfer of power in Germany as well. 
 
Part II. Hitler’s Rise: Reviewing Secondary Accounts 
 
Given the role of Nazi Germany in the history of the twentieth century, it is 
utterly unsurprising that historians have explored the general trajectory of Hitler’s ascent 
to power and the commencement of the Third Reich in great detail. But rather than 
reviewing the extensive bibliography related to this subject, two recent, comprehensive, 
and authoritative accounts by Michael Burleigh and Richard J. Evans will serve as 
10 
 
characteristic examples of how these events have been portrayed in post-war 
historiography. The following narrative of events will furthermore serve as a reference 
point for this essay’s subsequent reevaluation of the manner in which the events in 
question were both reported and understood at the time. 
The Weimar Republic was from the beginning a fragile creation. Established in 
the chaos following defeat in the Great War, its delicate nature was underlined by the 
method of its inception—Philipp Scheidemann announced the formation of a “German 
Republic” from a Berlin balcony, and it was so.  “Gun battles, assassinations, riots, 
massacres, and civil unrest” ruled the day in Germany.12 Slowly, and quite gradually, 
statesmen like Gustav Stresemann began to bring Germany back from the brink. An 
economic crisis triggered by crippling war debts and hyperinflation threatened to upset 
the delicate balance in the fledgling republic, but as foreign minister, Stresemann’s 
maneuverings brought a semblance of stability to the still reeling country. Despite 
sanctioning the lenient treatment of an Austrian revolutionary who had attempted to 
incite an uprising in a Munich beer hall in 1923, Stresemann made few missteps in his 
handling of the state. Beginning with the Dawes Plan of 1924, he negotiated a 
reorganization of Germany’s reparation payments, and in doing so helped to “ensure that 
paying them was a practical proposition.”13 The following year, the signing of the 
Locarno Treaties signaled Germany’s reemergence on the world stage, joining the 
League of Nations and securing the evacuation of the last Allied troops from the 
Rhineland. But the promise of the 1920s soon gave way to despair. 
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Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 78. 
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 Ibid., 108. 
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Whether it was the cause or merely a symptom, the collapse of the U.S. stock 
market in October of 1929 signaled the onset of a worldwide economic crisis. German 
recovery had been predicated in large part on foreign investment, particularly from the 
United States. Once those funds were no longer forthcoming, German industry ground to 
a halt. The tenuous hope of the 1920s quickly gave way to panic and despair. In less than 
three years the official number of unemployed jumped from 1.6 million to 6.12 million 
by February 1932. If one were to take into account all those who did not appear on the 
government’s registry, the number may have been as high as 9 million. Including 
dependents, the total number of Germans affected by unemployment may have been as 
high as 23 million people—over a third of the country’s total population.14 This enormous 
influx of government dependents put a devastating strain on an already overburdened 
relief system. With no other outlet, “boredom turned to frustration,” and society seemed 
to descend “into a morass of misery and criminality.”15 This environment proved to be 
fertile ground for extreme political groups. The National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party (NSDAP) worked to provide unemployed members with free meals and lodgings. 
However, as Burleigh has noted, the relationship between unemployment and Nazi 
expansion was often an indirect one: since a good deal of unemployed Germans felt more 
drawn to the Communist Party, it was actually the increase in the Communist ranks that 
“helped to propel other anxious voters towards the Nazis.”16 Whatever the case, the 
depression stimulated an escalation of paramilitary violence between various extremist 
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 These figures are taken from Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2000), 122-123. 
15
 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, 233. 
16
 Burleigh, 128. 
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groups, of which the Nazis and Communists were the most powerful. Significantly, “as 
Germany plunged deeper into the Depression, growing numbers of middle-class citizens 
began to see in the youthful dynamism of the Nazi Party a possible way out of the 
situation.”17 
Though the economic crisis helped to create the conditions by which Adolf Hitler 
and the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, the crisis alone did not provide a 
sufficient environment in which the Nazis could simply seize power. Germany was still a 
functioning republic under the formidable aegis of Reichspräsident Paul von 
Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg. Hero of the Great War and second President of the 
German Republic, Hindenburg was initially an implacable foe of the Nazis and 
contemptuous of their leader. However, over the tenure of Hindenburg’s administration, 
parliamentary government had undergone a “steady atrophy,” particularly under the 
governance of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning.18 A moderate politician with little sympathy 
for the Nazi cause, Brüning nevertheless played a significant role in laying the foundation 
for a National Socialist dictatorship. Under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the 
German chancellor was legally granted the ability to rule without parliamentary consent 
in times of crisis. By issuing “emergency decrees,” with the approval of the sitting 
president, Brüning was able to effectively remove the Reichstag from the legislative 
process, often by simply dissolving that body when it protested. Brüning was neither the 
first nor the last chancellor to invoke Article 48 privileges, and few at the time would 
have doubted that the continuing economic disaster constituted a national crisis. Yet 
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during his two years in office, Brüning enforced measures that helped to blur the line 
“between parliamentary democracy and authoritarianism.” 19 The implication here is 
clear: Hitler’s predecessors were slowly but surely undermining the foundations of 
democratic government. 
When Brüning resigned in May 1932, two governments followed in quick 
succession, the first under Colonel Franz von Papen and the second under General Kurt 
von Schleicher. Their combined tenure of less than eight months was brief but 
momentous. Both men supported the idea of giving Nazi leaders access to power, albeit 
in a limited capacity. Unlike Brüning, his successors felt that saddling Hitler and his 
associates with a degree of governmental responsibility would serve to temper, or “tame” 
their radicalism. However, elections in November 1932 saw the Nazi vote fall by around 
two million, with a subsequent loss of 30 seats in the Reichstag. But no matter— Hitler’s 
“rat-like cunning” was more than enough to overcome a problem as trivial as a lack of 
votes.20 Colluding with von Papen, still resentful of his unceremonious dismissal, Hitler 
hashed out an agreement that would bring him to the Chancellorship, with von Papen as 
Vice-Chancellor. Though their support had diminished, the Nazis were still a politically 
potent force. Working together, the two men successfully alienated von Schleicher and, 
more importantly, convinced Hindenburg to withhold from the chancellor the usual 
powers granted by Article 48. Thus, after a mere 57 days in office, von Schleicher 
resigned. Following a series of secret meetings and back room deals, von Papen 
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convinced Hindenburg to endorse the Hitler-von Papen coalition government. He swore 
in the new chancellor on January 30. 
January 30 therefore “marked the beginning of the Nazi seizure of power.”21 What 
followed in the next few months was a series of events that inexorably accelerated the 
demise of law, as well as a “creeping authoritarianism” that destroyed the last vestiges of 
German democracy.22 Though still nominally leading a coalition government, Hitler 
moved quickly to consolidate power in a series of political maneuvers. The first 
opportunity for action was presented by the Reichstag Fire on February 27. Allegedly the 
work of Communist agitators, one of whom had been found at the scene and already 
confessed, the fire was followed the next day by an emergency decree which “abolished 
rights guaranteed by the Weimar constitution.”23 Civil rights were quashed. The rights to 
assembly, freedom of speech, of the press—all gone at the stroke of a pen. With such 
troublesome items as civil liberties out of the way, the Nazis’ “seizure of power could 
now begin in earnest.”24 As Evans seems to suggest in this description, the Reichstag Fire 
Decree was simply another step in Hitler’s consolidation of power—a necessary stepping 
stone that bridged the gap between democracy and dictatorship. Less than a week after 
this measure was enacted, on March 5 a national election took place that would 
effectively serve as a referendum on the Hitler Cabinet. In the days leading up to the 
election the Nazis advanced a “combination of terror, repression, and propaganda” 
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throughout Germany.25 But beyond that, Hitler and his associates made it clear that the 
election results were ultimately of no consequence. The Nazis had acquired power; Hitler 
would not be resigning due to a trifle like a vote of no confidence. Surely, it should have 
been obvious to any reasonable observer that these “elections” were not only shambolic 
in the sense that an intimidated electorate had little choice in terms of which party it 
could vote for, but also because Hitler and the Nazis had made it clear that they had no 
intentions of relinquishing power. 
As it happened, the Nazi coalition won with a majority vote. For the moment at 
least, Hitler’s promise to stay in power even in the event of electoral defeat became a 
moot point. Yet he still had one more trick up his sleeve—one more step to firmly 
entrench himself in power. As things stood, parliamentary consent was an unnecessary 
feature of legislative enactment. However, presidential approval was still a requirement. 
Since such a potential check on power was unbecoming for a dictatorial government, 
Hitler proposed an Enabling Act which would, in essence, remove this last restraint on 
unilateral authority. Though the existence of the Reichstag as well as the president’s 
position would not be affected (in theory at least), the act would for all practical purposes 
make the Weimar constitution “a dead letter.”26 As Burleigh dryly notes, while in some 
democracies “constitutional amendments are especially solemn moments,” under this 
new law in Nazi Germany “they were easier than changing the traffic regulations.”27 The 
Reichstag obligingly passed the Enabling Act by a vote of 444 to 94, thereby allowing 
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Hitler and his cabinet to rule by decree and establishing the basis for “the permanent 
removal of civil rights and democratic liberties.”28 In other words, this latest event 
signaled the final death of German democracy. 
Throughout the historical narratives of Evans and Burleigh (and countless other 
chroniclers of the Third Reich), a sense of inevitability permeates the story. A sequence 
of events emerges in which a clear progression from democracy to dictatorship is all too 
apparent. From the perspective of a modern day researcher, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this view. In fact, such an analysis is a critical part of the historian’s job—to 
see connections, monitor developments, and link events together in order to come to a 
fuller understanding of a complex and confusing past. Yet as other historians have 
suggested (Evans himself included), viewing the past through the lens of the present 
introduces its own set of challenges. As subsequent portions of this essay will argue, 
though casual observers in January 1933 may indeed have viewed Hitler’s ascension to 
power in Germany as troubling, there were likely just as many who were unconcerned or 
even indifferent to who, exactly, was calling the shots in Germany—especially among the 
American populace, which is the subject of this particular discourse. Though it is clear 
today that developments like Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, the Reichstag Fire 
Decree, and the Enabling Act – all of which came about in quick succession early in 1933 
– did indeed contribute to the rise of Nazi Germany, and by extension the destruction that 
state wrought, such understandings are a product of the present, and were by no means 
common to the average American who was living through those same events. In the 
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following section, a detailed exploration of the events of January through March 1933, as 
reported in the American news media, will seek to reveal the extent to which Americans 
would have been aware of happenings in Germany. This analysis will form the basis of a 
later discussion that will suggest that the events in question were not, at the time, 
universally viewed with the same sort of foreboding portrayed in much modern 
scholarship. 
 
Part III. Reporting Germany: The American Media 
 
Even in the modern age of scientific polling and research institutions devoted to 
public opinion, gauging the pulse of the population remains a challenging and inexact 
endeavor. This venture becomes even more daunting when one attempts to assess the 
temperament of a populace nearly eighty years after the fact. But American public 
opinion in early 1933, while elusive, can provide important insights into the attitudes and 
assessments that greeted Hitler’s ascension to power in German politics. As the 
discussion in the previous section has suggested, to assume the existence of a universal 
sense of dread or foreboding toward the emergence of a Nazified Germany may be 
premature. But in order to recapture both the nature and the scope of the contemporary 
American perspective (or more accurately, perspectives), it is first necessary to establish 
exactly how much Americans knew about the facts surrounding developments in 
Germany during this time.  Once a clearer picture emerges of what Americans actually 
18 
 
knew, it will become a simpler task to draw conclusions about what they might have 
thought. 
Whether through radio bulletins, daily or weekly print publications, or the 
newsreel footage that accompanied every viewing in movie theaters, Americans had 
ample opportunities to learn about the goings-on in the rest of the country as well as the 
world at large. By 1930, daily newspaper circulation in the United States was hovering 
around forty million, and steadily climbing.29 By mid-decade, around 70 percent of all 
U.S. households had at least one radio set (twice as many as those which had 
telephones).30 By decade’s end, somewhere around eighty-five million Americans were 
heading to the movie theaters each week.31 In short, if anyone was uninformed, it was by 
choice. But the news provided Americans with more than just information. It gave them 
the facts with which to form opinions and, often, suggestions of what those opinions 
should be. A common theme in much of the literature surrounding the role of journalism 
in modern society is the extent to which it molds opinion. Historian of journalism 
Leonard Ray Teel has unequivocally stated: “What newspapers say forms public 
opinion.”32 In a similar vein, Edwin Emery (1914-1973), another authority on American 
media, has characterized the dissemination of information through news outlets as the 
primary source “upon which public opinion is so largely dependent.”33 Thus, though 
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“public opinion” is far from a monolithic entity, an examination of some of the news 
reports in early 1933 throughout various media will give a reasonable depiction of both 
the opinions of certain Americans, as well as the information that helped to shape them. 
In a country as vast as the United States, “mass media” takes on some very literal 
meanings. On the one hand, it was truly a resource for the masses. There was furthermore 
a truly massive amount of outlets for dissemination.  Newspaper circulation alone was 
around forty million copies – daily – as early as 1930. This medium itself therefore 
presents real selection challenges. Of the four media types utilized for this analysis – 
newspapers, radio, newsreels, and national periodicals – the two print resources are 
drawn on most heavily. Not only are they more widely available for researchers, but they 
include a good deal of overlap with other media. As Teel has pointed out, early 1930s 
news broadcasts over the radio consisted of brief readings of items already published in 
dailies or acquired from newswire services, like the Associated Press or the United 
Press.34 And despite the growing popularity of radio in America, during the first half of 
the 1930s, “few listeners considered their radios a major source of news.”35 In other 
words, during this period, the printed word was still “the primary source of news and 
information in America.”36 Additionally, transcripts from important radio broadcasts 
could often be found in printed news reports, including speeches by state leaders as well 
as commentary from radio journalists. As for newspapers and periodicals, two of the 
nation’s largest dailies and two of the largest national magazines have been chosen: The 
                                                          
34
 Teel, 146. 
35
 Marquis, 405-406. 
36
 John Tebbel, The Compact History of the American Newspaper (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 
1966), 229. 
20 
 
New York Times and The Chicago Tribune for the former category, and Time and 
Newsweek for the latter. In addition to being among the country’s leading publications, 
they were also generally representative of the two prevailing schools of thought in 
American foreign policy—isolationism and interventionism. The Times and Time 
magazine generally “strongly supported the president on foreign affairs,” while 
Newsweek and The Tribune in particular “headed the list” of isolationist publications in 
the United States.37 Thus, these resources together provide us with a reasonably 
representative, if not exhaustive, sampling of information and opinions circulating in 
America in early 1933. 
As 1933 dawned, an attitude of cautious optimism could be detected in the 
nation’s leading newspapers. In Chicago, readers would hear of a hopeful spirit pervading 
the country, “expressive of the hope that the new year would bring better things.”38 
Business was improving and cafes, hotels, and restaurants were reporting excellent 
business for the first time since the Depression struck. New Yorkers were given a 
similarly optimistic picture: “the advent of 1933 again meant hope—hope for the return 
of prosperity.”39 Yet all was not well with the world. As January wore on, Americans 
would have found themselves increasingly bombarded with news of political 
developments in Germany. On January 17, reports that German Chancellor Kurt von 
Schleicher was planning “the formation of a State militia or the readoption of 
conscription” that would return Germans to the “compulsory service of pre-war days” 
                                                          
37
 Cole, 478. 
38
 “Chicago In Gay Mood Looks To Better Times,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 1, 1933. 
39
 “1932 Is Hooted Out, New Year Greeted With Noisy Revelry,” New York Times, January 1, 1933. 
21 
 
found their way into American newspapers.40 The undeniable allusion to the militaristic 
Germany that precipitated the First World War (then, simply The Great War) may well 
have given readers pause. Less than two weeks later, the media announced that 
Chancellor von Schleicher, “the Chancellor of peace,” had resigned from office, thereby 
leaving the political situation in Germany “a picture of complete confusion.”41 Perhaps 
even more ominously, the possibilities of that “militant leader of the National Socialists,” 
Adolf Hitler, taking power as chancellor were “greater than ever.”42 
When Hitler was, in fact, appointed as chancellor on the following day, concerned 
rumblings were reported from all over Europe. In Hungary, one official voiced his 
disquiet in no uncertain terms: “The only certain thing is that difficult times are ahead for 
Germany and a serious shock which may affect the destiny of all Europe can hardly be 
avoided.”43 From Yugoslavia came similar sentiments, heralding the rise of Hitler as “the 
rebirth of the old, imperialistic, warlike Germany thirsting for revenge.”44 One Austrian 
newspaper wrote that the appointment opened up “disastrous prospects for Germany at 
home and abroad.”45 In Poland, the news was greeted as a welcome development—but 
only to the extent that it would alert the rest of Europe to the inherent danger posed by 
resurgent German nationalism.46 So far, these accounts would seem to lend credence to 
the view that Hitler’s rise to power, even before he had performed a single act in his 
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capacity as chancellor, was received with widespread foreboding. Indeed, in an editorial 
appearing in the Times on January 31, one contributor wrote that it would be “useless to 
try to disguise the qualms with which the news from Berlin must cause to all friends of 
Germany.”47 After all, Hitler was a man who had openly vowed to destroy the German 
Republic and set up a “personal dictatorship” in its place.48 Clearly, concerns were 
present over the implications of a German government run by the National Socialist 
leader from the very outset of his administration. 
In the weeks following Hitler’s appointment, news coverage continued to bring 
Americans all the latest developments coming from the German Reich. Early in February, 
Americans would have learned of ongoing rioting, political clashes, and the violent 
deaths of German partisans. One newsreel showed footage of torch lit processions, as 
uniformed paramilitary units marched past a glowering Hitler, haranguing his supporters 
from the Reichstag balcony. During the footage, the narrator informed viewers that 
“bloodshed is a daily occurrence” between Nazis and Communists.49 Reports also 
surfaced of restrictions placed on the press. Reporting from Berlin, Times correspondent 
Frederick T. Birchall told Americans of measures curbing the abilities of political 
opponents to disagree with Hitler in print. Additionally, even foreign newspapers “critical 
of Chancellor Hitler, his party or his program” were forbidden to be circulated within 
Germany.50 Equally startling may have been the speedy dissolution of the Reichstag. 
Since Hitler headed a government without a working majority, he “promptly obtained a 
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decree dissolving the Reichstag” and called for new elections on March 5.51 That such 
knowledge troubled many Americans is beyond dispute. In what may have been a 
common sentiment, one editor in the Tribune expressed the view that as of yet, nothing 
about Hitler’s personality or the views of his party encouraged “much hope in the 
American mind that the Fascist movement will produce lasting good for Germany or 
avoid the costly errors of domestic tyranny and international friction or collision.”52 Here 
again allusions to a militaristic, imperial past can be detected. Though such a threat may 
not have been perceived as imminent at that time, the lessons of the Great War had 
shown just how costly the errors of “international friction” could be. 
As the March 5 elections approached, some of the pronouncements coming from 
Hitler and other Nazi officials would have done little to mitigate the unease some 
observers may have felt. One member of the Hitler cabinet, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, a 
nationalist but not a Nazi himself, told supporters in a speech that “the present Cabinet 
would hold on, irrespective of the results of the Reichstag election.”53 On a similar note, 
Chancellor Hitler warned: “If the people should desert us, that will not restrain us! 
Whatever happens we will take the course that is necessary to save Germany from 
ruin!”54 Additionally, word soon spread that the Nazis were moving to ban any political 
rallies supporting the opposition.55 So much for democratic elections. In terms of foreign 
affairs, the outlook may have appeared equally unsettling. Hitler had recently made a 
“frank presentation” of his proposed foreign policy for Germany, in which he asserted 
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that “Germany will increase her armaments unless France disarms,” and furthermore 
demanded control of the Polish Corridor, a narrow strip of land separating East Prussia 
from the rest of Germany.56 Both of these demands were an apparent abrogation of the 
Treaty of Versailles, and moreover threatened to undermine the Disarmament Conference 
that had been taking place in Geneva since 1932. Given the nature of developments like 
these, it is unsurprising that many Americans had serious misgivings about the 
implications of Nazi leadership. 
The next major event in Hitler’s assault on democracy occurred late in February, 
not even a full week before the Reichstag elections. On February 27, Nazi officials 
apprehended one Marinus “van der Lurgg” at the scene of the burning Reichstag 
building.57 Van der Lubbe, as the man was actually named, was a Dutch bricklayer cum 
arsonist, with links to the Communist Party. An immediate crackdown on German 
Communists, including standing Reichstag members, followed. Suggestions soon came 
through the American media that perhaps the Communist conspiracy theories bellowed 
out by the Nazi leadership were less than credible. After all, it played nicely into Nazi 
hands that their main political rival seemingly lost the plot days before an important 
election. In Newsweek, it was reported that “patly enough, too patly to satisfy the foreign 
press,” the Nazis found the exact sort of conspiracy they had been warning the German 
people about.58 Time gave a similar assessment, citing reports coming from outside of 
Germany that suggested the Nazis themselves were responsible for the fire, “for reasons 
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only too obvious.”59 But debates over whether van der Lubbe acted alone, under duress, 
for the Communists or for the Nazis were ultimately academic. The real issue appeared 
the following day, when the Hitler Cabinet enacted the Reichstag Fire Decree. Reactions 
in the press were measured, but a degree of anxiety was evident. Not only did the decree 
give Hitler “a tyrant’s powers,” but it also made possible “far reaching interference with 
personal liberty.”60 In addition to the presence of a healthy dose of skepticism with regard 
to the source and motivation behind the fire in popular reporting, there was also a sense 
of wariness over the seemingly predictable Nazi reaction to it. 
Evidence of this unease can be found throughout March as well. Reports that the 
chancellor would soon become a dictator were common. In the wake of the Fire Decree, 
Newsweek wrote that Hitler essentially ruled Germany “from border to border.”61 The 
Chicago Tribune was even more explicit: “Germany is now well on the way to Fascist 
dictatorship. Chancellor Hitler . . . has been given the legal tools to annihilate the last 
vestiges of the democracy which he considers a failure.”62 This sort of commentary was 
commonplace even before the Enabling Act passed later in the month. Thus, after the Act 
was finalized on 23 March, while some reactions were strong, hardly any exhibited much 
surprise. The Act, which “transformed an ex-corporal into a Dictator,” endowed in Hitler 
more power “than even Bismarck dreamed of.”63 Similarly, the front page of the New 
York Times the day after the Act passed declared that Hitler was now, truly, “the master 
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of Germany with power greater than that of any of his predecessors.”64 Such reports 
seemingly would have left little room to doubt the scope of Hitler’s victory. But although 
the media gave a realistic picture of Hitler’s power, it did not follow that all speculation 
on the future of Germany and the rest of Europe was uniformly negative. 
It is easy to look back over some of the headlines in early 1933 and assume that 
readers would have seen the beginnings of a dark and dangerous period in world affairs. 
After all, the rise of a tyrant in a country with a less than stellar reputation when it came 
to its foreign relations could hardly be considered anything but troubling. But having 
concerns is not the same as accurately anticipating the trajectory of global events. As the 
following section of this analysis will attempt to show, although Americans were for the 
most part fully informed about developments in Germany, and often expressed a certain 
degree of trepidation about what they knew, in 1933 it was entirely unclear how things 
would play out. A whole range of factors, including what was going on domestically, 
developments in other parts of the world, and the very real uncertainty over the unfolding 
German situation suggests that rather than viewing the emergence of Nazi Germany as an 
imminent danger, Americans would have, initially at least, been more likely to regard the 
new chancellor as little more than a side show. Though they often get lost in modern 
accounts, there were other issues, other nations, and other developments in the early parts 
of 1933 that seemed to present more pressing concerns for the American populace. 
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Part IV. Alternate Perspectives: Contextualizing American Attitudes 
 
Domestic Distractions 
 
If one were to go back in time, poll the American public in the first few months of 
1933, and ascertain which issue seemed most pressing – the election of a reactionary 
politician in Europe or the new president’s plan for economic recovery – it is likely that 
the overwhelming majority of Americans would have identified the latter. Though no 
such survey exists, a reexamination of contemporary media reports suggests that there 
were more than enough troubling domestic matters to either render news of a new 
German government inconsequential or, alternately, to make at least some Americans 
sympathetic to the seemingly drastic developments over in the German Reich. 
In 1933 the United States was still very much in the throes of the Great 
Depression. The stock market had imploded, the banking industry was in shambles, 
unemployment grew unchecked, and, most alarmingly perhaps, “the fear of public unrest 
was such that machine guns guarded government buildings.”65 This scenario, seemingly 
more suited to a totalitarian state, was what greeted Franklin Roosevelt as he took the 
oath of office on March 4. Even though the new president was taking office less than a 
week after Hitler’s Fire Decree and a day before the March 5 “elections” in Germany, the 
policies of the Nazi Party did not really figure into the American president’s thoughts—
or at least not those thoughts he shared with the public. In Roosevelt’s own words, the 
purpose of his inaugural address, broadcast over the radio and reprinted in papers 
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nationwide, was “the putting of first things first.”66 And those things were identified 
unequivocally: “Our greatest primary task is to put people to work.”67 When he addressed 
the nation on that late winter day, his 1,800 word speech devoted a mere 54 words to 
foreign affairs. The gist of this brief aside was that America would follow a “good 
neighbor” policy. Though the details were short, his implication was clear: domestic and 
economic issues would be the administration’s primary focus. 
This mindset was reflective of a “general belief that foreign policy must play a 
secondary role until the domestic crisis was eased.”68 About a week later, in his first 
“fireside chat,” Roosevelt made no reference whatsoever to Hitler, Germany, or foreign 
affairs in general. If we recall that Roosevelt was speaking at a time that the public had 
full knowledge of Hitler’s victories in Germany – that coercive elections had been held, 
that legislation providing for the elimination of civil liberties from German citizens had 
been enacted, and thousands of political opponents had been subsequently jailed – it may 
seem surprising to the modern reader that next to nothing concerning these developments 
was coming from the chief executive. However, this lack of attention helps to illustrate 
the central argument of this study—namely, that while we understand that same 
progression of events in Germany as obviously leading toward the cataclysm of World 
War II, Roosevelt and his contemporaries did not (and could not) have the same 
understanding. This basic observation represents just one of the many “gaps” in historical 
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consciousness referenced in the opening section of this essay. While the knowledge of 
Munich in 1938 or Normandy in 1944 inevitably leads the modern-day historian to 
question Roosevelt’s emphasis early in his administration, it can also obscure the fact that 
places like Detroit and D.C. were far more central to American concerns than Dunkirk or 
Dresden—which only seem relevant according to a post-war persepective. 
Inherent in the above review of the all-consuming pressures of the domestic crisis 
is the idea that although what Franklin Roosevelt actually said was important in shaping 
domestic opinion, it is equally important to consider the things he did not say. If, as some 
historians have contended, Roosevelt played an instrumental role in swaying the 
American populace toward intervention in European affairs, 69 it seems reasonable to ask 
the question: did the president’s lack of public engagement on foreign affairs early in his 
first administration contribute to a sense of indifference over events in Germany? It is a 
difficult question to answer with certainty but it seems logical to presume that had 
Roosevelt expended his considerable energies toward a more robust foreign policy earlier 
in his tenure, isolationist sentiment might not have lasted as a political force for as long 
as it did.70 For when the president spoke, America listened. Though he purposely limited 
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his radio addresses to the nation for fear that such repeated appeals would “erode his 
welcome and diminish the effect of his words,” when Roosevelt took to the airwaves, so 
many listeners tuned in “that unaffiliated stations carrying other programming at the same 
time found themselves without an audience.”71 But whatever the exact nature of his 
contributions toward American attitudes on Nazi Germany in the first few months of 
1933, there is evidence that a desire to focus energy internally went beyond presidential 
pronouncements. 
In February, one editorial in the Chicago Tribune opened by stating: “Our 
preoccupation is again with our own internal troubles.”72 In a similar vein, a feature by 
columnist Charles Mertz in The New York Times appearing the day after the inauguration 
outlined ten major issues confronting the new president. Though the author conceded that 
no brief summary could “adequately describe all of the questions with which the 
incoming President must deal,” only the last four issues were foreign in nature.73 National 
currency, the budget, the national debt, the banks, farm relief, and railways were all more 
pressing issues domestically. As for foreign affairs, tariffs were “the first readily apparent 
problem,” in addition to war debts, armaments, and general security.74 Tellingly, two of 
the four foreign issues were economic in nature, while the only specific reference to 
national security issues was “the troubled course of Far Eastern affairs.”75 Later in the 
month, the same publication carried an editorial that summed up what may have been a 
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popular opinion at the time: “As is proper, we are leaving to Europe the formation of 
plans to deal with problems that are most particularly European.”76 A common theme is 
easy to find here: America needed to pull itself out of the Depression; until then, the rest 
of the world was on its own. Whether or not Roosevelt was the driving force behind this 
attitude is merely academic. The important point here is that although one can also find 
evidence that some Americans were concerned about the direction Germany seemed to be 
taking, there were others who were more anxious to solve problems at home first. 
So worried were some Americans over combating the Depression that they were 
even willing to consider some unorthodox and even, perhaps, some un-American 
solutions. As early as his first inaugural address, Franklin Roosevelt floated the idea of 
expanding executive authority in light of the present crisis in no uncertain terms. While 
the “normal balance” of executive and legislative authority had been “wholly adequate” 
in the past, the “unprecedented demand and need for undelayed [sic] action may call for a 
temporary departure” from the traditional arrangement of power.77 Even more tellingly, 
he warned that should Congress fail to agree to this so-called “temporary departure,” the 
president would not “evade the clear course of duty” as he saw it and would presumably 
act as he saw fit in spite of Congress.78 Although his critics would accuse him of 
dictatorial ambitions (and not for the last time), Roosevelt’s message was “applauded” by 
many across the nation.79 At this early stage, “the American people, the Congress, 
businessmen, workers, and farmers alike shared in an almost desperate eagerness to 
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follow a leader who might restore prosperity”—an attitude, incidentally, that was 
mirrored by more than a few German voters.80 
Public reaction to this seemingly startling course reveals that at least some 
Americans were unfazed and indeed supportive of such measures. In the Tribune, one 
editorialist argued the President’s case. It was necessary to “vest in the President full 
power to accomplish without check or delay” the process of economic recovery, “and 
therefore to the release and mobilization of the vast resources of the nation for the work 
of restoration.”81 Furthermore, the reasons for adopting this plan of action were “so 
concrete and so pressing that [FDR] had to act as he did in demanding immediate 
authority to carry out a program of economy.”82 Additionally, Americans would not have 
to worry about some of the less than savory sides to dictatorial government. For as one 
proponent had argued even prior to the inauguration, Roosevelt would not be “the grim 
and arbitrary dictator which some enthusiasts are declaring to be the need of the hour,” 
but rather a “genial and smiling one.”83 Presumably, as long as the president smiled or 
laughed as he exercised (or abused?) authority, trickier questions of procedure or 
constitutionality would cease to matter. Whatever the case, even before Roosevelt took 
the oath of office, many Americans were “going over bodily” to the “conception of an 
absolute ruler.”84 
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Moreover, it was not just private citizens who supported the scheme. Former 
Governor of New York Alfred E. Smith had earlier called for FDR to either act as or 
establish a “public works dictator” to aid in the nation’s industrial and economic 
recovery.85 Roosevelt’s running mate John Nance Garner was equally adamant: “I want to 
give the President unlimited power to reduce the cost of government. Practical experience 
has shown that Congress is not going to do it . . . . I am really in earnest about this.”86 The 
proposal to give Roosevelt “broad and extraordinary powers in the reorganization of the 
Federal Government for economy and efficiency” was likewise lauded by John Jay 
Hopkins, assistant to the outgoing Secretary of the Treasury.87 Understandably though, 
not all were enthralled, especially some members of Congress. Senator from Idaho and 
leading isolationist William E. Borah wryly commented that “I should hope that if 
Congress should ever undertake to confer dictatorial powers” on the president, they 
would then have the decency to resign.88 But on whatever side of the debate one fell, 
clearly this was a topic of some import. And while few, then or now, would liken the 
FDR administration to Hitler’s tenure, some obvious parallels are apparent nevertheless. 
Both men came to power as elected officials tasked with righting the ship of state. Both 
asked for expanded executive authority at the expense of the legislature to deal with 
unprecedented emergencies. Such similarities did not escape the notice of an engaged 
American audience. 89 And although it is difficult to conclude with certainty, it seems 
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reasonable to surmise that given the broad perception of the need, unfortunate though it 
may have been, for a strong and authoritative leader at home, at least some Americans 
could have accepted a similar necessity faced by other countries. As absurd as it sounds 
in the twenty-first century to compare the newly-elected Franklin Roosevelt to the newly-
appointed Adolf Hitler, if we recognize the vast difference between the historical 
consciousness of an American in the post-war world and an American in 1933, the 
juxtaposition of an American president with a German dictator becomes significantly less 
far-fetched. 
Such a mindset may appear strange in hindsight. But it is important to remember 
that the Great Depression was a watershed event in not just U.S., but also global history. 
Andrew Nagorski, former foreign correspondent and senior editor for Newsweek, has 
gone as far as to claim that so greatly had the Depression “shaken many core beliefs,” 
many Americans felt “that everything was debatable,” including whether the dictatorial 
tendencies of Nazi government at this still early stage was a good or a bad thing.90 In 
terms of the scope of its impact across society, few events can compare. Franklin 
Roosevelt used the crisis to affect a comprehensive reworking of the role of government 
in American society, the effects of which are still apparent to the present day. But more 
important for the purposes of this study is the extent to which it influenced the actions 
and attitudes of Americans early in 1933. During a time when, for many Americans, day 
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to day existence presented a real struggle, happenings in other parts of the world may 
have simply seemed inconsequential to their more immediate concerns. What did the 
actions of an Austrian firebrand matter to a family without the means to buy food? And 
furthermore, why should Americans have cared if Germany was flirting with a 
dictatorship when similar ideas were circulating about (with a good deal of support, too) 
at home? If we examine the facts as they were in early 1933, it becomes clear that the 
happenings in Germany, no matter how distasteful they may have appeared (either then 
or now), may have quite easily paled in comparison to the troubled state of affairs 
domestically. And even for those who cared to look abroad in those first few months of 
1933, it is quite likely that they would have seen far more causes for concern than 
rumblings of trouble brewing in Germany. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
 
During the first few months of 1933, Americans would have seen and heard with 
increasing regularity reports of violent oppression in a particular foreign country. One 
concerned writer took it upon himself to notify the folks at home of the conditions as they 
were: “a political reign of terror exists. There is no freedom of speech nor liberty of the 
press. A rigid censorship prevails. Criticism of the administration is barred; foreign 
papers are seized or confiscated.”91 In this country, rule is implemented through “high-
handed methods and ruthless procedures by which all constitutional rights are dragged in 
                                                          
91
 “Conditions In Cuba,” New York Times, February 6, 1933. 
36 
 
the dust.”92 Moreover, “numerous political prisoners are still in jail” and “an elaborate 
espionage system exists.”93 Times columnist Russell Porter told a similar story, writing 
that this country’s leader had been ruling “with an iron hand,” to the extent that his 
detractors regarded him “as a dictator and a tyrant.”94 The “secret police and strong-arm 
squads” terrorized the population, while the administration’s opponents clogged the 
nation’s jails.95 In the capital city, American newspapers and magazines, including the 
prestigious Time, were “seized and destroyed” in retaliation for negative coverage of 
events there. 96 If one were to leave the account at that, many present day observers 
would, not unreasonably, make the immediate leap to Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler. 
Indeed, much of the preceding description could be applied with equal validity to Hitler’s 
Germany, though perhaps not as early as 1933. The above accounts, however, in actuality 
refer to the government of Cuban President Gerardo Machado. 
It is easy to forget that the pre-war world involved more than just a progressive 
German march toward war. Americans were certainly aware of Herr Hitler’s 
achievements, if not his ultimate designs, but as the above example illustrates, the rest of 
the world did not stand still while Hitler began to remake Germany in his own image. 
Cuba’s General Machado represented just one in a long list of potentially threatening 
foreign situations facing the United States in 1933. That some viewed Hitler with 
trepidation is beyond question. But it is also worth asking if other heads of state or 
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matters of foreign policy may have given Americans at least as much pause as the new 
German chancellor. This type of contextualization is crucial if we are to gain a fuller 
understanding of the initial American reactions to Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Thus, 
in this present section we will explore pertinent topics such as the contemporaneous 
prevalence of dictatorial governments, the incidence of civil unrest globally, the presence 
of any threats, direct or otherwise, to U.S. security, and finally any additional mitigating 
factors that may have made the specter of Nazi Germany less menacing than it has 
appeared in hindsight. This investigation will provide further evidence that the 
appearance of Nazi government on the world stage did not, and could not, appear as 
momentous as later history would prove—and as later historians have made it to be. 
In its first April issue in 1933, Newsweek gave a brief but significant synopsis of 
the global situation in the aftermath of Hitler’s Enabling Act: if one were to survey the 
world’s governments, it would soon become clear that the list of functioning dictators 
was now “a long one. Dictatorships since the war have been [as] common as thrones 
before it.”97 According to the article, Italy, Spain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Austria, Albania, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Greece all represented the European 
contingent of authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian governments, with Germany only being 
the most recent member. South America too had its share, and as we have already seen, 
Cuba was the closest to the United States geographically. Therefore, although a Nazi 
dictatorship in Germany may still have been unwelcome, it certainly would not have been 
out of the ordinary given the prevalence of authoritarian regimes worldwide, and 
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especially in Europe. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that in light of the severe 
economic depression in many parts of the world, Americans would have been more likely 
than was their wont to view with understanding, if not outright support, strong executive, 
even dictatorial, governments at this time. 
Indeed, in the case of Cuba some Americans had initially believed that the 
country “needed to be ruled by a strong man in the economic emergency,” that Machado 
“was doing the best he could in a very difficult situation,” and that “any alternative 
Cuban government would only make matters worse.”98 Another report on the 
circumstances in Portugal under the rule of General Oscar Carmona suggested that 
dictatorship might even be a good thing under the right circumstances. After four years 
“without a Parliament or any elected body,” Portugal was enjoying a balanced budget, 
ample and cheap supplies of food and wine, and a generally peaceful political 
landscape.99 These examples are not to suggest that all dictatorships were looked upon 
favorably by the American public, nor that every absolute head of state effected such 
encouraging results. What they do indicate, however, is that given the political and 
economic circumstances in early 1933, both domestically and abroad, Americans would 
have, perhaps, been at least as likely, if not more so, to receive news of Nazi leadership in 
Germany with a sort of hopeful indifference as with a sense of foreboding dread. 
Although the world was far from a peaceful place even before the Nazi depredations 
across Europe, given the unspeakable violence perpetrated in the name of dictators from 
Hitler to Pol Pot in the last sixty years of the twentieth century, the term “dictator” itself 
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may have seemed far less threatening in 1933—yet another example of the gap in 
historical consciousness from then to the present day. 
 Another factor which may have mitigated a hyper-focused sensitivity to 
developments in Germany was the high incidence of civil as well as international unrest 
in a whole host of countries besides the new German Reich. In early 1933, the German 
people were not the only ones grappling with questions of domestic and foreign affairs. 
The first few months of 1933 saw reports of violence and infighting from all over the 
globe. Early in January, Americans would have learned that Ireland had dissolved its 
Parliament in the midst of deadlock and political infighting. Casualty reports coming 
from the ongoing Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay listed the total dead, 
wounded, or missing at 7,200 from a recent battle. 100 Items such as the Spanish 
government’s debates over a “rebel massacre,” Brazil’s threats to rush its fleet into the 
Chaco conflict, “rebellious outbreaks” in Argentina, and a revolt by “80,000 Moslem 
tribesmen” against British colonials in India also punctuated news reports.101 On March 
13, the Tribune reported on a Soviet air strike thought to have killed as many as 17,000 
Cossack tribesmen.102 Even France was not free from the contagion of domestic turmoil: 
after being “overthrown” by “a boisterous, crowded chamber of deputies,” the French 
government was “facing a fight for existence.”103 Taken as isolated events, none of the 
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above may have seemed particularly concerning for most Americans. Even as a whole, it 
may have only served to reinforce a sense that international issues were too complex, too 
widespread for the American government to address. However, when reviewing 
contemporary media reports, it is clear that with regard to one country at least, Americans 
were paying special attention to developments. It lay not in Europe or even South 
America, but in the Far East. 
 About a week before Hitler came to power, Time magazine featured a lengthy 
cover piece on the Japanese Empire. Quoting Japanese War Minister Sadao Araki, the 
article left little doubt that the island nation was promoting a dangerous brand of foreign 
policy: “The spirit of the Japanese nation is, by its nature, a thing that must be propagated 
over the seven seas and extended over the five continents. Anything that may hinder it 
must be abolished, even by force.”104 Japan’s earlier takeover of Chinese Manchuria 
(renamed Manchukuo) provided a forceful testament to Araki’s statement. Despite 
international censure, in the form of a 42-1 League of Nations vote (the one dissenting 
vote coming from Japan itself) that Japan withdraw from Manchuria or risk sanctions, 
Japan remained adamant about their right to territorial expansion. This bellicose stance 
helped to contribute to a certain degree of wariness within the United States. One 
editorialist sought to avert the public’s gaze from domestic issues to “events in the far 
east and their implications,” namely, the fact that the U.S. ranked third in terms of 
auxiliary ships – naval vessels that were not classified as battleships – behind Japan.105 
Lest Americans be lulled into a false sense of security by the qualifier “auxiliary,” that 
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author warned readers that the term conveyed “a sense of unimportance which is 
erroneous.”106 In other words, the piece implied that Japan, if not an outright threat, was at 
the very least a direct competitor to the United States. 
 Later, in March, after Japan had formally announced its withdrawal from the 
League of Nations, Chinese diplomat Eugene Chen made the Japanese threat much more 
explicit in a bulletin issued by the Chinese government: “Japan’s major object is to 
frustrate an Anglo-American naval combination in the Pacific, thus enabling Japan to 
consolidate its position on the Asiatic mainland in preparation for a decisive war against 
the United States.”107 He went on to identify Japan’s main aim as to “drive the American 
fleet from the Pacific.”108 Although the Chinese government likely had ulterior motives in 
inciting the U.S. to intervene with Japan, the fact remains that there were no similar 
warnings regarding Germany—at least to the extent that it was planning a “decisive war” 
against the United States. Furthermore, some Americans recognized a potential threat 
even before China’s warning. “Interestingly enough,” wrote columnist Edwin L. James, 
Japan’s claim for maintaining control of the Caroline Islands in the Pacific was that they 
were of “great strategic value to the Japanese navy” in that they served to “take the 
Japanese flag some thousand miles or more eastward in the Pacific”—towards the United 
States, as a matter of fact.109 In sum, not only was Japan the only country breaching 
international agreements in early 1933, from the League Covenant to the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, it was also more openly militaristic than any other nation—including Germany. 
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Such could not have escaped the notice of most Americans. In fact, an early February 
newsreel featured cheering crowds greeting the army of Japanese General Tamon, after 
their “victorious campaign against Chinese and Manchurian irregulars.”110 Combined 
with the detailed coverage available in print and over the radio, such images would have 
only underlined the realities of Japanese aggression. 
But in spite of what some may have perceived as threatening developments 
around the globe, all was not doom and gloom in early 1933. In fact, one can find 
evidence of a real sense of optimism regarding the future. If we recall that much of the 
world was engaged in serious discussions over disarmament in Geneva, then perhaps 
expressions like the ones found in certain opinion pieces make a bit more sense. Take the 
following sentiment from a January editorial: the author identified a “change in spirit” in 
world affairs. “The path to ultimate agreement may be long and stony, but the world is 
entering upon it. This is the main and sufficient reason for the universal lifting of 
morale.”111 While a buoyed morale may have been, in reality, far from universal, it is safe 
to assume that at least some observers would have found the ongoing international 
engagement encouraging. Even once the Nazis had assumed control, there were those 
who saw reason to be optimistic. In late March, even “the gloomiest Chancellor of the 
Exchequer England ever had” said that “the world situation was likely to improve in the 
next few months,” and that “it was evident matters on the Continent had undergone a 
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remarkable and beneficial change.”112 Even though the statesman speaking was Neville 
Chamberlain, this was well before the momentous conference at Munich. It also does not 
change the fact his attitude reveals that optimism over the state of world affairs was 
present to a certain degree in early 1933. Though the Disarmament Conference had yet to 
achieve any significant accord, it may come as a surprise to learn that many 
contemporaries blamed the lack of agreement not on a menacing and saber-rattling 
German Reich, but on the vindictiveness and intransigence of one of the victors of the 
Great War. 
The Treaty of Versailles had been a source of frustration and no small amount of 
bitterness to Germans of all descriptions since its ratification in 1919. In particular, 
Germans took issue with the crippling reparation payments as well as their relegation to 
second rate nation status relative to the military capabilities of their European neighbors. 
But it is important to note that Germany’s demand for arms equality and a more balanced 
reparations agreement actually received support from some of her erstwhile enemies. In 
principle, most of the major nations had agreed to “strive to obtain for Germany and other 
powers ‘equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations.’”113 
But how that was to be achieved was a different issue entirely. For Germany at least, the 
answer was clear. Either other nations needed to disarm and come down to her level, or 
Germany needed to be able to rearm herself to international parity. This seemingly 
straightforward point of view was, in fact, widely accepted in Europe. Indeed, towards 
the end of March, one article from a European correspondent testified that “Statesmen in 
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Europe” had come to a general agreement the Versailles treaty was “a cancer eating away 
the health of Europe and must be cut out before permanent health can be restored.”114 If 
Europe agreed to address the central object of German scorn, what then was preventing 
the implementation of a solution? Interestingly enough, it was France, rather than 
Germany, that came out as the major stumbling block to a peaceful resolution. As far as 
Great Britain saw it, the trouble was “caused by the French demand for security,” and 
their unequivocal insistence on “superiority of arms over Germany,” which they would 
not compromise “either by disarming France or by Germany rearming.” Moreover, the 
French stance in opposition to Italy’s pleas for naval equality was “equally menacing.”115 
Though history would vindicate this Gallic obstinacy, most contemporaries were unable, 
or at least unwilling, to adopt such a seemingly aggressive posture. 
Consequently, this view of France, rather than Germany, as the source of both 
past and future trouble was evident at home as well. In the Tribune, one commentator 
went as far as to declare that not only was France complicating the current European 
situation, but it was ultimately responsible for the demise of German democracy and the 
Weimar Republic “by exactions and repressions which the spirit of the [German] people 
could not tolerate . . . Conservative German statesmen, one after another, were broken 
when their peaceful overtures to France brought nothing but humiliation to the 
Germans.”116 Such failures in turn opened the door for radical politicians “and finally the 
                                                          
114
 John Steele, “Treaty of Versailles Must Be Revised, Europe Agrees,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 23, 
1933. 
115
 Ibid., “Disarm Parley Near Failure; MacDonald to Go to Geneva,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 4, 
1933. 
116
 “France Destroys The German Republic,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 24, 1933. 
45 
 
land became a battlefield where communists and Hitlerites fought for control.”117 Aspects 
of this indictment are echoed in a similar piece that appeared in the Times, wherein the 
writer justified the negative view of France: “The record in this country in the last ten 
years shows we are interested in world peace, while that of France indicates that her 
prime consideration is national aggrandizement.”118 The author went on to berate the 
French for refusing to pay its own war debts, even though it had the resources, pointing 
out that when Germany missed a payment, “a French army was sent to the Ruhr.”119 In 
short, “other nations were willing to make concessions, but not France.”120 These 
opinions, while surely not universal, nevertheless reveal a line of thinking that runs 
counter to the common narrative. Though Nazi Germany eventually proved a far greater 
threat to world peace than a wary France, in the first few months of 1933, it was the 
French that actually appeared to be a bigger problem in the eyes of some observers. 
French obduracy aside, a peaceful resolution to European ills still seemed 
attainable at this early stage of Nazi rule, whether through progress at Geneva or other 
diplomatic channels. One such avenue still being explored at that time was the so-called 
Quadrilateral Theory, or what later became known as the Four Powers Pact, wherein the 
major players in European politics—Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy—would 
coordinate their respective energies in order to bring the Disarmament Conference in 
particular and international disputes in general “to a satisfactory end.”121 By the end of 
March, none other than Italy’s Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini made steps to formalize 
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the agreement to lay “the foundations for a European ‘peace club.’”122 Specifically, this 
Four-Power Pact was designed to strengthen the existing Locarno Treaty by guaranteeing 
maintenance of the existing Franco-German frontier but would also serve the larger 
purpose of ensuring “an era of world peace.”123 Though an actual treaty had not yet been 
signed, news reports gave accounts of ongoing discussions for “an enlightened agreement 
between all countries of Europe” that would involve a revision of Versailles as a sine qua 
non.124 Although the eventual treaty failed to live up to its lofty aims (in fact, France did 
not even ratify once it was signed), developments like this would have offered some 
measure of hope during a time which, as we have seen, had more than its due share of 
difficulties. 
In reassessing the state of global affairs in the early months of 1933, it becomes 
apparent that although the initial maneuvers of the Nazi regime in Germany may have 
certainly troubled the American citizenry, these developments were far from the only 
source of concern. With dictatorships more widespread than ever, revolution raging just 
off the Florida coast, and naked Japanese aggression in Asia (to list but a few), it would 
have taken an unusually prescient observer to predict that a seemingly limited, if virulent, 
strain of German nationalism would become the springboard for another global war—
especially in light of the ongoing and well-publicized efforts at international diplomacy. 
There were, of course, those who predicted just that, but as their foresight did not extend 
to an entire population, neither should we impose it upon that same group. To do so 
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would be to ignore the gaps in historical consciousness this essay has been endeavoring 
to establish. Rather, it is important to acknowledge the many factors that would have 
informed American public opinion, not the least of which being the news and 
pronouncements coming out of Nazi Germany itself. 
 
Concerning Germany 
 
 The image that emerges from a review of the domestic landscape of early 1933 as 
well as the much broader picture of global affairs is one of equal parts activity and 
uncertainty—a recipe, incidentally, that could very well describe any period in history, up 
to the present day. In this final piece of the current analysis, we will conclude the 
investigation with a closer look at Germany itself. Domestic turmoil and no shortage of 
foreign distractions may have prevented some Americans from concerning themselves 
with Germany’s new Nazi rulers, but was there anything specific to the German situation 
itself – whether pronouncements from the regime’s leaders, criticisms from its detractors, 
or the apparent nature of the power structure – that might have ameliorated American 
anxiety? As the following examination illustrates, if any American was looking for more 
reasons to quell a sense of disquiet or concern, there were plenty of mitigating factors to 
be found within the German situation itself. 
 From Washington D.C., “little apprehension was voiced concerning the effect the 
appointment of Hitler might have on international relations. It was believed the 
responsibility imposed upon the new chancellor would result in a more conservative 
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policy than he has heretofore pursued.”125 Such measured responses reveal that even 
outside of the context of domestic strife or other international matters, Chancellor Adolf 
Hitler did not induce a nationwide panic. Rather, there were a number of factors that 
would have led Americans to take the news with varying degrees of equanimity, 
indifference, and even hopefulness. First of all, we must consider the nature of Hitler’s 
rise to power. It often gets lost in modern discourse that Hitler and his Nazi Party came to 
power through a legal, democratic process. Though historians like Richard Evans have 
referred to a “Nazi seizure of power,” in reality Hitler’s appointment as chancellor and 
even his subsequent dissolution of parliamentary government were achieved through 
legal and constitutional means.126 Reflecting on this phenomenon, the German author and 
expatriate Emil Ludwig noted towards the end of the Second World War that “no 
American President ever rode to Capitol Hill with more legal right than Hitler on his way 
to the Wilhelmstrasse.”127 The reason why a misunderstanding of the early Nazi victories 
still persists may be due to pronouncements from the Nazis themselves, who labeled their 
takeover of government, legal though it was, as a Machtergreifung—literally, a seizure of 
power. Thus, Evans and others have simply taken their cues from contemporary accounts. 
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It should be noted, however, that media portrayals in 1933 did in fact take note of 
the legality, or at least the constitutionality, of Nazi rule. After the March 5 elections, a 
Tribune article reported that while Hitler may now have the power to eliminate 
democratic government, that power had been given to him “by the vote of the people.”128 
Likewise in the Times, one writer opined that “despite surface appearances,” Hitler’s 
victories had been achieved “not by physical force but essentially by the employment of 
the spoken and written word” (incidents of voter intimidation notwithstanding).129 
Furthermore, the new government was a true expression of German will: “No German 
government since 1918 could lay equal claim to have been commissioned by its 
constituents.”130 Moreover, if the abolition of democratic government was indeed the aim 
of the Nazi Party, it could do so with the “authorization from a majority of German 
citizens.”131 The article ends on an interesting note: “Democracy means different things to 
different people.” 132 In other words, although the German government was tending 
toward a dictatorship, the fact that it was established through plebiscite meant it was still 
an expression of a democratic process. 
 If characterizing Nazi government as a form of democracy seemed too large a pill 
for Americans to swallow, perhaps the structure of the new regime would have proven 
more reassuring. Though the Hitler dictatorship is usually dated from January 1933, the 
chancellor was actually a member of a coalition government in the early part of his 
tenure. Surrounded by such powerful figures as Franz von Papen (a former chancellor 
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himself), Nationalist leader Alfred Hugenberg, and, of course, the Reichspräsident Paul 
von Hindenburg, Hitler was by no means master of Germany. Of the eleven members of 
the new cabinet, only three, including Hitler, were Nazis. As Time magazine explained it, 
“the fact that Germany’s new Cabinet is so full of ‘safeguards’ sufficiently explained last 
week the equanimity with which best posted observers greeted the advent of Chancellor 
Hitler.”133 And although Hitler was the titular leader of government, “closer scrutiny” 
revealed that the Vice Chancellor von Papen would be the one pulling the strings. A 
known favorite of Hindenburg, von Papen’s presence in the cabinet was widely 
understood to function as “a buffer to National Socialist influence.”134 Additionally, the 
all-important matters of industry, agriculture, and labor were in the hands of Dr. Alfred 
Hugenberg—a nationalist like Hitler, but otherwise “diametrically opposed” to the new 
chancellor.135 Even more significantly, the German Army, “the main factor for 
maintaining law and order,” fell under the authority of General Werner von Blomberg—
“a soldier and nothing but a soldier.”136 To wit, one of the general’s first acts as Minister 
of Defense “was to announce his intention of ‘purifying’ the army of all ‘political taint’ it 
might have acquired in the party struggles of recent years.”137 Finally, there was “Old 
Paul” watching over everything. Even after the Enabling Act, commentators pointed out 
that the president still had the power “to dismiss any or all members of the Cabinet 
including Handsome Adolf himself.”138 In short, the Hitler Cabinet was “generally 
regarded as an ingenious device whereby Hindenburg’s men [could] keep an eye – and 
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hand – on the Nazi chieftan.” The bottom line? Hitler was “regarded as a prisoner of von 
Papen, Hugenberg and the ‘Generals.’”139 
 As anyone who cared to know would have found out, while Hitler’s initial power 
appeared fairly wide, there were also some significant limitations—at least in theory. But 
let us consider how the more cynical observer may have viewed things. For there were, of 
course, those who would have dismissed any talk of “safeguards” as little more than 
wishful thinking (which history has shown to be the case). Assuming that Hitler was both 
the nominal and de facto leader of the new government, there were still a number of 
reasons for Americans to look favorably upon a Nazi-run Germany. To begin with, his 
pronouncements concerning Germany’s position with regard to the rest of the world were 
almost uniformly peaceful. His first statement in the capacity of chancellor contained the 
following declaration: “We want to live in peace and friendship with our neighbors. We 
want peace and quiet internally to enable business to recuperate and give us time to 
reorganize the nation.”140 Days later, in his “radio debut” as chancellor, Hitler articulated 
his main goals as rehabilitating agriculture and eliminating unemployment. He 
furthermore voiced his hope that the ongoing Disarmament Conference “would yield 
such results as not to make it necessary for Germany to rearm.”141 In general, Chancellor 
Hitler “spoke more moderately in tone and words” than he had “as the roving spellbinder 
of the last two years.”142 Though he remained firm on the principles of German freedom 
and equality among nations, he also “avowed full recognition ‘of the solemn duty of 
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working for the preservation of international peace.’”143 Significantly, such policies did 
not represent any sort of departure from the stated aims of previous administrations, as 
various media reports made clear.144 
 Perhaps as a result of this degree of continuity, American reaction to the 
chancellor’s statements was generally positive. His professions of honest friendship with 
America (it “could not be imagined otherwise”145), his wish to combat the economic 
depression, to put Germans back to work, to secure “the rights of private property & 
capitalist enterprise,”146 to rid the nation of Godless Communism, to ensure a peaceful 
Europe, his request for four years to right the ship of state (the same term, incidentally, as 
the U.S. President)—all these were goals that Americans could, and did, identify with. 
Many, even those who saw firsthand the early stages of Nazi government, were 
understanding, if not totally enamored, with Germany’s apparent new course. The 
outgoing Ambassador to Germany Frederic M. Sackett, for one, recognized economic 
recovery as a critical element in political peace: since economics were the basis of a 
nation’s politics, “a great many of the political dangers of Europe can be, I am sure, over 
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come if there is a wise treatment of its economic problems.”147 And if a dictator was 
required to affect that recovery, then so be it. It is significant that there were similar 
suggestions that America needed a dictator of sorts, and the connection to the German 
situation did not go unnoticed: “The belief that the United States is about ripe for an 
experiment in dictatorial government . . .  prompts constitutional experts here to draw 
comparisons between the American and German charters, particularly with respect to the 
authority invested in the executives of the two countries.”148 Though Sackett’s successor, 
William E. Dodd, left Germany with a decidedly (and understandably) gloomier outlook 
in late 1937, he too lacked an initial understanding of the implications of Nazi rule. In a 
letter to Roosevelt shortly after arriving in Germany, Dodd urged Americans to have 
patience with Germany’s new leaders: “fundamentally, I believe a people has a right to 
govern itself and that other peoples must exercise patience even when cruelties and 
injustices are done. Give men a chance to try their schemes.”149  
 As for the battle against Communism, though Americans were still a couple 
decades away from the panic and paranoia of McCarthyism, the Red threat was a very 
real part of the American political culture, and consequently, a fear that made certain 
Nazi policies relatable. One Tribune writer opined that “American opinion shares the 
Fascist hostility to communism and must sympathize with any sane determination of the 
German people to overcome its menace, morally unify and invigorate the German spirit, 
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and restore and fortify the elements of German character and body politic.”150 
Furthermore, unlike “the Reds in Russia,” the Nazis were not “defying the established 
world.” They were “not seeking to create in Germany a people with spear heads pointed 
to the rest of the world but a nation reorganized for better association with other 
countries.” Their objective, at least in theory, was “to unite Germany, to free it from the 
limitations imposed by an unjust treaty and to give it the place to which its natural power 
and accomplishment would entitle it.”151 That some Americans in 1933 saw Communism 
as a more immediate threat than Nazism is a small but powerful illustration of the 
significant distance between contemporary understandings and present-day 
assessments—the breadth of the gap between historical consciousness then and now. 
At the same time that some Americans were recognizing parallels in the domestic 
positions of Germany and the United States, they were also looking somewhat 
uncritically (today, one might say naively, but that is the very type of characterization this 
study strives to avoid) at Hitler’s assurances of his peaceful intentions. In an early 
meeting with the foreign press, Hitler had spoken to them “with tremendous earnestness: 
‘Anybody who knows war as I know it knows what a tremendous waste of effort or rather 
what a waste of strength it is . . . nobody wants peace more than I do, more than the 
German people do.’”152 It is important to appreciate that to this point, there were no 
compelling reasons to doubt the chancellor’s professions (though that is not to say that no 
one did). Thus, even after the Enabling Act, Newsweek characterized the foreign policy 
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Hitler continued to advocate as “mild as milk.”153 Time magazine only differed marginally 
in its assessment, arguing that German foreign policy was actually as “mild as 
buttermilk.”154 Whichever bovine byproduct one prefers for comparison, these judgments 
are indicative of a willingness to give the new German leader the benefit of the doubt. 
That German foreign policy ultimately took a decidedly different turn over the lifespan of 
the Third Reich is beside the point. 
If one needed further assurance that Hitler’s Germany was less threatening than 
some made it out to be, there was still the notion that the acquisition of power was indeed 
smoothing out the rougher edges of Nazi doctrine. Almost immediately upon Hitler’s 
appointment, reports were appearing with the suggestion that especially violent or radical 
aspects of the Nazi program were being tempered. By March, Hitler himself was issuing 
orders, through “manifestos” as well as radio broadcasts to his followers: “I call upon you 
to guard the honor and dignity of the new regime . . . I therefore enjoin on you, from now 
on, the strictest and blindest discipline. Henceforth all individual actions must cease!”155 
Additionally, he called on supporters to “seize such disturbers” who upset order or put 
the regime in a negative light and “surrender them to the police.” 156 Even more 
importantly, it appeared that his directives were taking effect. The arrest of three Nazis 
(by other Nazis, no less) in Cologne for the attempted robbery of a Jewish man was 
labeled in one article as “the direct result of Chancellor Hitler’s order to his followers to 
cease acts of terrorism and to refrain from interfering with the business life of the 
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nation.”157 If one wanted verification from a more official authority, Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull went on record saying that the improving domestic situation in Germany, 
particularly among the country’s Jews, was due to the “demands for discipline by 
Chancellor Hitler.”158  
Jewish authorities in Germany had a similar message, some even going as far as 
to say that reports of anti-Semitic atrocities were “pure inventions,” and that the efforts to 
curb violence had been effective.159 Some of these organizations may have simply been 
trying not to antagonize the new administration, but that would not have necessarily been 
apparent at the time. Or perhaps German Jews, most of whom considered themselves as 
simply German, did not want to believe that rhetorical anti-Semitism would ever become 
a reality.160 Indeed, the German Jewish writer Carl Zuckmayer later wrote that “many 
Jews considered the savage anti-Semitic ravings of Nazis merely a propaganda device, a 
line the Nazis would drop as soon as they won government power.”161 Though few 
Americans would have gone as far as to deny the existence of anti-Semitism in the Nazi 
program as well as in German society in general, the impression given was that Hitler 
was working toward a more moderate domestic policy. 
Although such a development would have proven welcome news to many 
Americans (Jewish Americans especially), the ugly truth is that anti-Semitism was not a 
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uniquely German, or even European, phenomenon. The United States too has had a less 
than exemplary history of domestic anti-Semitism, though it should be noted that the 
“ingrained prejudices of respectable people” was ultimately a far cry from the violent, 
political anti-Semitism that exploded across Europe in the first half of the twentieth 
century.162 Nevertheless, in the blunt estimation of Leonard Dinnerstein of the University 
of Arizona, “Jew hatred permeated the United States.”163  It may be then, that an 
uncomfortably large percentage of Americans (who were overwhelmingly white and 
Protestant) would have felt little sympathy for the plight of the German Jew. In fact, just 
as there were those who supported Nazi foreign policies but condemned Nazi treatment 
of their own citizens, there were those Americans who were wholly averse to Hitler with 
the exception of his anti-Semitism. The son of financial tycoon J. P. Morgan once told a 
friend that he strongly disapproved everything about Hitler “except for his attitude toward 
the Jews, which I consider wholesome.”164  
Attitudes such as these were indicative of what Erik Larson has labeled as a 
“sentiment pervasive in America, that Germany’s Jews were at least partly responsible 
for their own troubles.”165 Moreover, as the economic crisis deepened in the early 1930s, 
“Hitler’s attacks on Jews as the root causes of the world’s economic and social problems 
no longer seemed so outrageous” to many Americans.166 Even American Jews were 
divided on how best to respond to the evolving Nazi policies. On one side, the American 
Jewish Congress was calling for “all manner of protest” while the more cautious 
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American Jewish Committee “counseled a quieter path, fearing that noisy protests and 
boycotts would only make things worse for Jews still in Germany.”167 But one point both 
organizations could agree on was that “any campaign that explicitly and publicly sought 
to boost Jewish immigration to America could only lead to disaster.”168 In short, Nazi 
anti-Semitism was neither completely alien to American sensibilities nor was it a strong 
enough issue to unite American opinion. Whether harboring a latent, cultural anti-
Semitism or no, Americans in the 1930s would have generally reacted less strongly to 
instances of legal discrimination and even physical violence than their present-day 
counterparts, who carry in their collective memory the chilling implications of phrases 
like Lebensraum, the Final Solution, and Arbeit macht frei.169 
For those who might have been unmoved by Germany’s economic plight, the 
German desire to right the wrongs of Versailles, Hitler’s calls for order, the stemming of 
overt discrimination, and for those who still remained skeptical of Nazi professions of 
peaceful intentions, comfort could perhaps be derived from the underlying sense of 
uncertainty over the Nazi Party’s ability to retain power. In the first few months of the 
Hitler Cabinet, there was no real consensus that either the chancellor or his party would 
be long in charge. Before Hitler’s appointment, the Times had noted that the recently 
dissolved von Schleicher government had been the twentieth cabinet in only fourteen 
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years of Weimar.170 Clearly longevity had not been a feature of recent German 
government. Thus reports coming out of Europe wondering “how big and how 
prolonged a flash Chancellor Hitler will be in Germany’s pan.”171 Specifically, French 
papers were curious to see “whether Hitler succeeds in maintaining power or he very 
soon falls.”172 Ambassador Dodd, eventually an ardent critic of the Nazi regime and one 
of the earliest European-based Americans to sound a note of alarm, was himself initially 
unsure of Hitler’s staying power in German politics. In late 1933, after experiencing a 
tepid reaction from German theater-goers to a newsreel featuring Chancellor Hitler, he 
mused in his diary that the Nazi leader was “surely not so powerful with the people” as 
most assumed.173 
Unsurprisingly, Americans at home had similar questions. One Tribune 
contributor tersely summarized the vague sense of uncertainty following Hitler’s 
appointment: “What combination the kaleidoscope of post-war German politics will 
bring at any turn no one, not even apparently the wisest German, can foretell.”174 So 
while it was certainly a possibility that Hitler and his Nazis would entrench themselves 
in their hard-won positions of authority, it was equally likely that the ruling coalition 
would collapse on itself like a dying star: “the National Socialist phalanx itself may 
disintegrate under the strain. There are even already some slight indications of such an 
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outcome.”175 If the Nazis managed to avoid that fate, there were other potential pitfalls. 
After returning from a trip to Germany, Dr. Thomas S. Baker, president of Pittsburgh’s 
Carnegie Institute of Technology, suggested that the German people themselves were 
unlikely to tolerate Nazi rule for long: “it will be surprising if a formidable resistance 
does not arise among the German people.”176 Though Hitler was already promising a 
Thousand Year Reich, Americans and the world at large were hardly convinced. 
But neither were Americans or the world convinced that Nazi Germany posed a 
real international threat, even were it so inclined. On the one hand, Germany in 1933 
was hardly the world power that we think of in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The 
country was bankrupt, its territories had been reduced, and its once great military force 
had been gutted. It was, moreover, “surrounded by a ring of nations” which, because of 
proximity, could not afford “to remain indifferent to events within Germany.”177 Thus, 
as one editorialist argued, any perceived threats coming from Hitler or his acolytes 
might “lead to consequences from which even the excited Nazi leadership might 
shrink.”178 In other words: “Today Germany is not yet in a position to defy her former 
enemies.”179 Nor, according to some opinions, did Germany want to antagonize the rest 
of the world. “No longer does the old Prussian spirit think it a badge of distinction to be 
                                                          
175
 Birchall, “Nazis Seize Jobs, Disregard Voters,” New York Times, February 24, 1933. There were also 
consistent rumors at this stage that a return to monarchy was imminent. Amid reports that the former Kaiser 
was having his luggage shipped back to Germany, well placed observers “who ought to know” seemed to 
intimate that the ex-monarch’s triumphant return was a question of when, rather than if (as it happened, the 
luggage was actually filled with used clothing that the Kaiser’s wife was sending to relief organizations in 
Berlin). See “Former Kaiser Awaiting A Call To Berlin; ‘Imperial Baggage’ Being Sent From Doorn,” New 
York Times, February 7, 1933; see also Schultz, “Hitler’s Aim To Restore German Monarchy Revealed,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, March 7, 1933. 
176
 “Predicts Revolt Against Hitler,” New York Times, March 4, 1933. 
177
 “Hitler In Power,” New York Times, March 7, 1933. 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Ibid. 
61 
 
criticized and disliked by other nations,” stated one writer.180 “Germany today cannot 
shut her ears to the voices” of world opinion.181 On the other hand, a dictatorial and even 
militaristic (if not militant) Germany was simply not a novel or shocking state of affairs. 
A common theme in contemporary accounts of Germany and the German people was 
that of the importance of authority. According to the popular view, Germans were, by 
nature, a people who gravitated toward strong leadership figures. 182 References to this 
belief were littered throughout contemporary news reports. One article reporting the 
results of the March 5 elections gave the following assessment: “the German collectivist 
leaning, the desire to be commanded rather than be free, has again prevailed.”183 Edgar 
Ansel Mowrer, former president of the Foreign Press Association, wrote in his 1933 
bestseller that any surprise over the unfolding failure of the Weimar Republic would 
only be due to an “unfamiliarity with the [German] national history,” since Germans 
were inherently “an undemocratic people.”184 But perhaps the best explanation for why 
the arrival of a new German dictator would not have appeared especially ominous to 
many Americans can be found in an editorial that appeared the day after Hitler’s 
appointment. 
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Throughout the piece, the author (who remains anonymous) writes about a 
difference between the political cultures of Germany and the United States. In America, 
“the military organization of conflicting political parties diametrically opposed in 
principle could only mean a quick explosion, dismemberment, and either anarchy or 
rearrangement into smaller units.”185 In Germany however, armed Nazis and 
Communists were merely “natural expressions of the regimenting, gymnastic habits 
which have formed a part of German life” for generations.186 Being unused to such 
habits,  
We could not conceive of stability or permanence in the terms of 
reichsbanner divisions, Hitlerite corps, communistic armies, and other 
regimented, uniformed, and goose-stepping partisans who apparently 
wanted nothing so much as each other’s blood. One day’s parade of such 
competent, disciplined, numerous, and zealous partisans would fill us with 
the most profound conviction that our days in a federated union were 
numbered.187 
 
But not so in Germany. In short, “what in America would mean unquestioned if not 
immediate war may be kept within the bounds of administration, although there is 
occasional fighting in the new republic of central Europe.”188 There was thus a 
fundamental difference between the American and German political culture—a different 
set of standards by which to gauge normalcy. Dictators, uniforms, marching, and even 
violence did not then equate to crisis. It was all par for the course for that “new republic 
in central Europe.” 
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 The legality of Hitler’s attainment of power, the countervailing effects of coalition 
government, pacific announcements regarding foreign policy, a sense of kinship over 
similar economic (the Depression) and political (Communism) challenges, the seemingly 
tenuous nature of Nazi control, the existence of domestic anti-Semitic sentiment, the 
safeguards of the European balance of power, the relative weakness of German might, 
and the sheer predictability of German politics – to list but a few – all would have helped 
to soften the blow of the apparent loss of democracy in Germany. When taking all the 
other trials Americans were facing at home and across the globe into consideration as 
well, it becomes easier to adjust our thinking (or historical consciousness) to 1933 terms 
instead of those of the present day. That Adolf Hitler and his Nazi followers struck many 
Americans as troubling, unsavory, or even vaguely threatening is beyond debate. But by 
recalibrating our viewpoint and putting aside for the moment our knowledge of what was 
to come, the beginning of 1933 seems less a harbinger of trouble ahead than simply 
another commonplace, if complex, period of history—at least to those who were living 
through it. That there were those who, for whatever reason, had an accurate sense, 
inclination, or a plain old lucky guess of what the future held should not obscure the 
equally valid feelings of nonchalance, uncertainty, and yes, even receptiveness with 
which others greeted the coming of the Third Reich. To understand this period any 
differently would be to fail to understand it at all. 
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Part V. Conclusion 
 
In a 1939 address to the prestigious Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
London, British historian Robert Ensor informed his audience that “very few great men 
of action have ever disclosed beforehand so clearly as Adolf Hitler the principles and 
purposes that guide their acts.”189 The model, or Weltanschauung, that Hitler offered was 
one that would eventually require the German people “to fight a great war.”190 The 
German dictator had clearly outlined his “cardinal concept” of Lebensraum, and at the 
time of the speech there was “less than no evidence” that Hitler’s fundamental thinking 
had changed.191 Why then, should there have been any surprise at the eventual trajectory 
of German politics? Ensor was referring, of course, to Mein Kampf, the rambling, anti-
Semitic political tract Hitler composed while serving time in a Bavarian prison cell. But 
like so many of the other “warning signs” that have been discussed in this study, the 
chilling details of Hitler’s political creed resonate more deeply now than they did during 
the pre-war years. One reason for this is surely due to an extremely limited domestic 
circulation. By early 1933, the book had not even been published in English. In fact, from 
October 1933 (when the first American edition was published) through 1938, barely 
15,000 copies were sold stateside.192 Clearly this was a work with which that vast 
majority of Americans were unfamiliar. 
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Even many of Hitler’s closest political allies apparently felt little urgency to 
acquaint themselves with their Führer’s magnum opus.193 For those Germans who did, C. 
Caspar has suggested that many may have agreed with the following response: “not even 
the most rightist circles in Germany ever took such hysterical ideas seriously.”194 Small 
wonder the majority of Americans would not have put much stock in such ideas, even 
among those few who may have been familiar with the book. But yet, perhaps the most 
salient reason the American public was generally unmoved by a perceived Nazi threat 
was that, simply put, the situation in 1933 was much more nuanced and complex than 
subsequent historical narratives have made it out to be. Just because our present historical 
consciousness can detect in a work like Mein Kampf the blueprint for the eventual course 
taken by Hitler’s Germany, it does not follow that an American audience in 1933, limited 
as it was, should have perceived Hitler’s pronouncements as anything other than 
“grotesque fantasies.”195  
After a few short months in office, Adolf Hitler had effectively, through legal and 
constitutional means, set himself up as Reichskanzler und Führer, the undisputed master 
of Germany. With the passage of the Enabling Act, parliamentary government was a dead 
letter, President Hindenburg was little more than “a rubber stamp,” and no one with any 
sense really thought that the four year term of the Act was anything less than a legal 
pretense. That the Enabling Act, like the Reichstag Fire Decree before it, was to provide 
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the “basis for the permanent removal of civil rights and democratic liberties,” none could 
doubt.196 After all, “the brownshirt terror on the streets was already comprehensive 
enough to make it quite clear what was now about to happen.” 197 Or so the story goes. 
The facts of this now familiar narrative are beyond doubt, but the assessments require 
some modification. Although we now recognize this critical period in German history as 
providing the legal and structural foundations of the Nazi dictatorship, and everything 
that was to follow, as this study has suggested, the shape of the ultimate course of history 
was in doubt. It was most certainly not entirely clear what was about to happen. While 
understanding facts is a faculty common to both the historian and the historical figure, 
what the historical figure “cannot see and foresee are the potentialities of these facts. 
What became a possibility in 1943 and a probability in 1944 was not yet evident in 1942 
and was highly improbable in 1941.”198 How much more so then, must these potentialities 
have been beyond the understanding of an American, or of anyone for that matter, in 
1933? 
Perhaps one final illustration will serve to demonstrate the challenge of 
understanding the past on its own terms—as well as the length of the gap between 
contemporary and present-day historical consciousness. In late March of 1933, an article 
appeared in the Chicago Tribune in which the policies of British Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald (Europe’s “ambassador of peace”) came under attack from a fellow Member 
of Parliament.  The MP, who accused the PM of “compressing the largest number of 
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words into the smallest amount of thought,” declared that the foreign policy of the current 
government had “brought Europe nearer to war than at any time since peace, making us 
weaker, poorer, and more defenseless.”199 It would likely come as no surprise to the 
modern researcher to learn that the MP with the acerbic wit and prophetic tone was none 
other than Winston Churchill. Furthermore, from the perspective of the present day, it 
would be easy to imagine the writer of the article sneering as he typed “ambassador of 
peace,” or cheering as he described the lone, stolid figure of Churchill defying the shouts 
and boos of his fellow Parliamentarians. But the Winston Churchill of 1933 was not the 
Winston Churchill of 1945. Though by no means an unknown figure, he was not yet “the 
Lion of Britain.” In fact, he was probably most famous at that point for his role in 
masterminding the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of the First World War. Thus, if one 
were to take a moment and glance again at the very same report, this time with (in theory 
at least) no preconceived ideas, MacDonald may be recast as the wise, experienced 
statesman, offering the world a viable plan for peace, while Churchill is transformed into 
a bitter, disgraced figure, vainly trying to regain political relevance. Obviously the 
interpretation, then as now, depends on the individual but this brief thought exercise 
hopefully reveals the extent to which our own subjectivities can color (and sometimes 
corrupt) our understandings of the past. 
 As the examples given in this analysis have suggested, if a particular narrative 
gets repeated often enough, it acquires the patina of dogmatic truth—sometimes at the 
expense of less visible, though no less important bits of historical nuance. Thus, if 
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Americans truly were “frightened and shocked” by Hitler’s rule in Germany from its 
onset, what is one to make of the pronouncements of a credible reporter over the NBC 
radio network, urging Americans to dismiss “any thought that Germany or the present 
rulers of Germany desire to go to war with anybody”?200 And if Germany was really the 
sole threat to world peace in the 1930s, how should one view the increasingly shrill 
headlines concerning another world power in 1933 (one with a fully mobilized military 
force to boot): “Japan Dares The World To Get Mandate Isles”?201 Acknowledging such 
factors as economic preoccupation at home, civil and international turmoil across the 
globe, and hopeful signs from Germany’s new leaders is a critical starting point in 
evaluating the worldview of any given American observer at the beginning of this (now 
evidently) fateful historical epoch. It is furthermore an important approach to beginning 
any historical exercise, as an essential element of authentic historical analysis is the 
recognition that we, as researchers, bring our own thoughts, assumptions, and 
preconceived ideas (our own historical consciousness) whether consciously or otherwise 
to our explorations of the past. As the preceding pages have attempted to illustrate, we 
must attempt to shed this intellectual baggage in order to come to a fuller understanding 
of the people, places, and events we hope to understand. 
Generally speaking, although the subject of this study has been Germany and 
America in early 1933, on a more fundamental level, its object has been one of function 
rather than form. Specifically, it has aimed to model a certain methodological approach 
when assessing any historical person, period, or event. Historians face a difficult task in 
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simultaneously using their exalted position (Gaddis’ “expanded horizons”) to make sense 
of the past without imposing their own temporality on the figures and events they seek to 
illuminate. For although we may not be able to relive the past, or to re-present it as it 
actually was, it does not follow that we should not seek to understand it, as Geoffrey 
Elton has said, “in its own right.” When we do so (or at least make the attempt) we open 
the door to little known, forgotten, and sometimes, if we are lucky, to entirely new points 
of view—expanded horizons indeed.  
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